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Leaked documents known as the Palestine Papers show that Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and his top aides were discussing how to reply to Olmert’s offer, but events inter vened: Olmert resigned; his foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, failed to form a replacement coalition; new elections were called; and Israel’s Gaza incursion, Operation Cast Lead, froze all Israeli-Arab contacts that didn’t involve bullets.
In March 2009, following Israel’s elections, Benjamin Netanyahu succeeded Olmert. Claiming Olmert had given away too much, Netanyahu offered to sit and negotiate “without preconditions,” by which he meant starting over from zero. That’s where things got stuck.
Fast-forward to March 2013. John Kerry, energetic new secretary of state, charged quixotically into the deadlock. Palestinians still insisted they’d only return to the table if the talks picked up where they left off — that is, with a 1967 baseline. Netanyahu still refused. Somehow, in the face of worldwide skepticism and mockery, Kerry got them back to the table. Nobody knows exactly what he said to them, or heard from them, to make that happen. The question is, who blinked?
The smart money said the sides had agreed to come to Washington only to negotiate a new basis for negotiating, and that given their incompatible positions, that was doomed to failure. But on July 30, Kerry announced negotiations toward a permanent agreement.
Some insiders say Kerry gave Abbas a written American guarantee that the talks would be based on the 1967 lines, though Netanyahu couldn’t say so publicly. In some versions, Kerry also promised them the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem for their capital. In those versions, Netanyahu received a parallel guarantee that Israel would be recognized as a Jewish state and that the Palestinians would declare an end to the conflict and all further claims. But it’s all speculation.
Some Israelis who know Netanyahu well say he’ll never accept anything like the 1967 lines and is merely playing for time. If that’s true, then either he lied to Kerry, in which case he’s risking a major crisis in U.S.-Israel relations next year, or Kerry didn’t give the Palestinians a 1967 guarantee, in which case their agreement to resume talks is inexplicable. But this, too, is all speculation.
And now comes the press conference. What did we learn? First, Kerry said publicly that the Arab League is behind what he’s doing. Given the complexity of Arab politics, that must mean that they’re heading toward something that can be passed off as the 1967 lines. Any other Israeli minister might have frowned at that, but Livni could smile: She accepted those borders in 2008. Expect some fireworks back home in Jerusalem in the coming weeks. Second, Kerry explicitly mentioned an “end of conflict” and “end of claims,” which means there’s an understanding of some sort on Palestinian refugees.
And Erekat’s long face? That’s a sign that the Palestinians gave up something big. But if it’s not the 1967 borders or refugees, then what? One possibility: Jerusalem. In semi-secret talks back in 1995, Abbas himself agreed to put the Palestinian capital in the village of Abu Dis, on the eastern slope of the Mount of Olives, and call that their Jerusalem. Could the Arab League buy into that — with, say, a land bridge to the Temple Mount? Could Bibi?
Contact J.J. Goldberg at email@example.com