Israel’s new gift to the far-right could help end the Gaza war
Approval for a controversial new West Bank settlement might appease holdouts against a ceasefire

Bezalel Smotrich, Israel’s far-right finance minister, displays a map of the West Bank land corridor known as E1, where plans for a new settlement have just been approved, on Aug. 14. Photo by Menahem Kahana/AFP/Getty Images
Israel’s far-right — and some of their opponents — would have you believe that approval for a new West Bank settlement in the area known as E1 is a death knell for a two-state solution. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who engineered the move, said it “erased” the two-state solution. Critics say the new settlement, which will cut through the West Bank, means the final burial of the dream of Palestinian statehood — no matter how many international powers intend to recognize a Palestinian state at September’s United Nations General Assembly.
Both sides are mostly wrong. The E1 settlement is a bad idea. But it will not end the possibility of two states.
The reason why should be evident to anyone who looks at a map and possesses even basic historical understanding .
E1 sits between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim, a settlement of nearly 40,000 people a few miles east of the capital. Every serious peace proposal — including former President Bill Clinton’s parameters from 2000 to 2001, the Geneva Accord in 2003, and Ehud Olmert’s 2008 offer — has envisioned Israel annexing Ma’ale Adumim and the corridor that links it to Jerusalem.
In exchange, the Palestinians would receive an equivalent area of land from Israel proper, probably in the Negev desert.
The basic formula by which Israel and the Palestinians would swap some territory in the creation of two separate states is already internationally accepted. Israel would, per proposals like those listed above, annex about 5% of the West Bank, allowing it to incorporate roughly 80% of current settlements, nearly all of them close to the old border. With Israel in turn ceding some land to the Palestinians, they’d be left with a state equivalent to 100% of the territory of the West Bank — plus Gaza.
The oft-repeated claim that E1 “bisects the West Bank,” imperiling this theoretical state’s practicality, is somewhat true but also misleading — because the long-assumed map already includes a corridor to Ma’ale Adumim. Road networks, tunnels and bypasses can preserve Palestinian contiguity. The building blocks of a two-state solution will survive this new infraction.
What may not survive it is what remains of Israel’s global image.
The war in Gaza has plunged Israel into unprecedented international isolation. Images of devastation, starvation and mass casualties coming out of Gaza have generated a diplomatic tsunami. The decisions of France, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia to recognize a Palestinian state are a direct response to the dire humanitarian situation that Israel has largely created.
Germany, one of Israel’s most devoted European allies, has imposed a partial arms embargo. The International Criminal Court has indicted the prime minister. The International Court of Justice is considering genocide charges. Protests around the world cast Israel as pariah.
In the midst of all this, authorizing E1 sends precisely the wrong signal.
It confirms to critics who care little for the details of the case at hand that Israel is interested only in permanent occupation of Palestinian territory — not peace. It will strengthen the case of the boycotters, weaken that of Israel’s allies, and further alienate moderates.
Within Israel, it is another spark for the tinderbox of anger at a government already accused of sacrificing the remaining hostages in Gaza and prolonging war for political reasons. On a practical level, it adds more settlers nobody needs.
Worst of all, it strengthens the case of those who say the only future is one state between river and sea, home to equal numbers of Jews and Arabs. Such a reality would be the death of Zionism through demography. If there is no partition, there are only two outcomes: Either Jews rule indefinitely over a disenfranchised Palestinian majority or near-majority, or Israel ceases to be the Jewish state. To a democratic Zionist, both are disasters.
There is one silver lining: The approval of E1 might help Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government come to accept a ceasefire in its war with Hamas.
Hamas has just accepted a proposal for a 60-day initial ceasefire and a phased hostage release. Given the scale of domestic Israeli opposition to the war at this point, this is the closest we have come to an endgame. Israel’s security establishment — which is reluctantly planning for a deeper incursion into Gaza in coming weeks, as the government has demanded — is doubtless pressing to accept it. The public is overwhelmingly in favor.
But the far-right parties on which Netanyahu depends have vowed to reject any deal short of “total victory,” a fantasy that even most generals acknowledge is unattainable. Should Netanyahu accept a ceasefire, Smotrich and his allies might walk. Approving E1 offers the far-right a symbolic triumph: Proof that their agenda continues to be a top priority. It could be seen as a down payment to keep them in Netanuyahu’s coalition — his government will collapse without their participation — even if he bows to reality in Gaza.
The irony is glaring: The project trumpeted by Smotrich as the burial of two states may, in fact, be Netanyahu’s insurance policy for making a ceasefire possible.
None of this means E1 is wise. It is wasteful, and destructive to Israel’s international standing. But it will not be the stroke that kills the two-state solution.
What does threaten that future is something deeper: The inability of leaders on both sides to recognize the opportunity for peace when it arises. If and when Israel gains a new government intelligent enough to offer a new partition deal, the true question is not whether the layout of the land will make partition impossible, but rather whether the Palestinians will grasp the chance. In 2001, and again in 2008, they did not.
The paradox is that the folly of E1 may hint at progress — an end to the war that could enable conditions to restart a peace process. By feeding the far-right its ideological meal, Netanyahu may be preparing to take the step he has so far avoided: ending the war in Gaza. If that is true, then what looks to some like a nail in the coffin of two states may instead be the wedge that keeps that coffin lid from slamming shut.