Skip To Content
JEWISH. INDEPENDENT. NONPROFIT.
Back to Opinion

Israel can dig in — or declare victory and gain advantages

This is a pivot point in the war. The path that Netanyahu chooses will have far-reaching implications across the globe

It is becoming clear that the price for the return of the hostages held by Hamas is the end of the Gaza War and the withdrawal of Israeli forces. No amount of death and destruction in Gaza will change this, because the demonic leaders of Hamas quite obviously do not care. Meanwhile, Israel continues to bleed — eight soldiers were killed on Saturday in the deadliest mishap for the IDF in six months.  

The Israeli government appears to have come close to accepting the brutal truth. Receiving the hostages in exchange for an end to the war is the logical outcome of the ceasefire framework which President Biden presented on May 31 as an Israeli proposal – and which Israel did not explicitly deny. Yet Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s concurrent statements that Israel will not relent until Hamas is destroyed appeared to contradict it, and Hamas now insists on clarity which Netanyahu may not be able, or willing, to provide.

So a pivot point arrives.

There are those hardliners in the Israeli government who argue that Israel should sacrifice the hostages. Theirs is a not-implausible narrative that Israel needs to carry on until Hamas surrenders or is destroyed completely as a military force in Gaza.  

This position, which should not be dismissed, holds that in Israel’s dangerous and hostile neighborhood only the decisive projection of power, and only crushing victory in every battle, can deter attack from one’s genuine enemies. It also leans on the Israeli consensus that a replay of Oct. 7 — when Hamas invaded and massacred 1,200 people — cannot conceivably be risked.

If Israel pursued this paradigm to the hilt, it would mean many more months of fighting in Gaza; Israel’s National Security Council chief, Tsachi Hanegbi, has estimated it would take at least the rest of the year.

This would almost certainly mean that Hezbollah would continue its attacks in the north from Lebanon. The constant shelling, since early October, has caused roughly 100,000 Israelis to be displaced from their homes, but has killed very few people. It is contained, but still an outrage, and unacceptable.

If this insanity goes on for months more, eventually an errant shell will kill a large amount of people and Israel will feel the need to move against Hezbollah decisively, almost certainly with a ground offensive into Lebanon.

That would probably bring massive rocket attacks on Tel Aviv and central Israel — something Israel has not yet really experienced. Israel would then feel compelled to attack Lebanese infrastructure, which is unfair on the one hand, since Lebanon does not control Hezbollah, but is also on the other hand the only thing that may conceivably deter Hezbollah. Though Hezbollah is an Iranian proxy, they also depend on some support in Lebanon, mostly from Shiites.

History is full of tales that caution against engaging in a two-front war: Napoleon and Hitler’s bad experiences being probably the most famous. Yet Israel is one of the exceptions: Its multi-front war in 1967 was among the most successful military efforts in recent history. Israel might roll the dice.

But such a war may not remain confined to a mere two fronts for very long, since Iran could get involved. If that occurred, the Americans could be drawn in — they have vulnerable military targets all over the Gulf. That is why the U.S. (along with France, which has sway in Lebanon) is currently engaged in feverish diplomatic efforts to bring de-escalation.

If escalation happens nonetheless, the Chinese and Russians may want to exploit the distractions for nefarious purposes in Taiwan and Eastern Europe, respectively. The fear that a version of World War III looms is not entirely outlandish; look beneath the surface, and you will see that the world order is near a nervous breakdown.

Such are the risks of Israel pressing forward — but the payoff would be that Hamas eventually would probably indeed be wiped out in Gaza. The hostages will also probably be dead. It’s not so clear that this would feel like much of a victory, despite the deterrence idea, especially as Israel itself could be badly damaged in myriad ways.

There is another narrative that says it is time to cut losses after more than eight months of pounding Gaza.

This would require Israel to agree to Hamas’ terms and pull out of the strip, essentially handing it back to the terrorist group. Hamas is much degraded, so it is not certain they would be able to control it — but they would have something like the right of first refusal. Infighting may erupt among jihadis, and murkiness may for a while prevail; the population might rip them limb from limb. Yet Hamas would claim victory, perhaps giving tailwind to jihadis everywhere (America and Europe being no exception).

In exchange for assuming such a risk, Israel would expect a series of rewards and advantages.

For starters, it will be expected that Hezbollah will end its attacks in the north. That might not mean that the population could immediately return to their homes, because Hezbollah would face demands to regroup north of the border which it will, at first, resist. But that front should become calmer.

The United States would be expected to make good on its proposals for a Western-Sunni-Israeli military alliance aimed at holding Iran at bay and featuring a normalization or even peace agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, completing the promise of the 2020 Abraham Accords.

These are not inconsequential benefits for Israel, and for the region as well as the Western world. Considering it is almost certainly the only way to rescue the hostages, the case for breaking in this direction becomes very strong indeed.

Part of the problem is that Netanyahu has set the bar for “total victory” so high; this is generally a bad idea in life, since failure to meet such a goal projects weakness and failure. Better instead, then, to declare victory and move on. Netanyahu’s benighted coalition allies would  rebel, and so his patriotism will soon be tested.

I hope you appreciated this article. Before you go, I’d like to ask you to please support the Forward’s award-winning, nonprofit journalism during this critical time.

Now more than ever, American Jews need independent news they can trust, with reporting driven by truth, not ideology. We serve you, not any ideological agenda.

At a time when other newsrooms are closing or cutting back, the Forward has removed its paywall and invested additional resources to report on the ground from Israel and around the U.S. on the impact of the war, rising antisemitism and the protests on college campuses.

Readers like you make it all possible. Support our work by becoming a Forward Member and connect with our journalism and your community.

Make a gift of any size and become a Forward member today. You’ll support our mission to tell the American Jewish story fully and fairly. 

— Rachel Fishman Feddersen, Publisher and CEO

Join our mission to tell the Jewish story fully and fairly.

Republish This Story

Please read before republishing

We’re happy to make this story available to republish for free, unless it originated with JTA, Haaretz or another publication (as indicated on the article) and as long as you follow our guidelines. You must credit the Forward, retain our pixel and preserve our canonical link in Google search.  See our full guidelines for more information, and this guide for detail about canonical URLs.

To republish, copy the HTML by clicking on the yellow button to the right; it includes our tracking pixel, all paragraph styles and hyperlinks, the author byline and credit to the Forward. It does not include images; to avoid copyright violations, you must add them manually, following our guidelines. Please email us at editorial@forward.com, subject line “republish,” with any questions or to let us know what stories you’re picking up.

We don't support Internet Explorer

Please use Chrome, Safari, Firefox, or Edge to view this site.

Exit mobile version