JD Vance just made a critical error in Israel — and time to curb Hamas is running short
The US needs to amp up pressure on the Arab world, not take a measured approach
Vice President JD Vance listens as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks during a meeting at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, Israel on Oct. 22. Photo by Nathan Howard – Pool/Getty Images
Columnist Dan Perry October 22, 2025
The arrival of Vice President JD Vance in Israel on Tuesday was, in one sense, encouraging. Vance’s presence, with presidential son-in-law Jared Kushner and Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, signaled that the United States remains focused on the Gaza endgame. That message of engagement was right, as was the trio’s repeated message that Hamas must disarm.
But something essential was very much wrong. There was no sign that the U.S. understands what it will actually take to bring Hamas to heel.
Vance, Witkoff and Kushner’s rhetoric was managerial, not martial. It conveyed commitment without urgency. The measured tones implicit in the warnings that “time” and “hard work” are needed betrayed a deeper failure to grasp what the moment demands. Because words will not disarm Hamas — the single step most necessary to any effort to create a lasting peace.
Now is not the moment for carefully explaining how complex disarmament would be. It’s the moment for applying all possible pressure to get that disarmament done. If this does not occur soon, President Donald Trump’s peace plan will not just fall apart but become a joke. The best-case scenario would be the embarrassment of a prematurely declared victory. The worst would be an echo of Neville Chamberlain proclaiming “peace in our time” amid the failed effort to appease Hitler in the run-up to World War II.
As soon as the firing ceased, Hamas began consolidating power, publicly slaughtering members of rival groups by the dozen. These are not the actions of a group that intends to move forward in accordance with Trump’s plan, which calls for its disarmament and removal from all governance.
Rather, these are the actions of a group that thinks it has achieved what it has wanted: to remain standing at the end of the war, and thus be able to claim victory and validation. True, it is standing atop the smoldering ruins left by two years of death and devastation, but its leaders are indifferent to that cost. Indeed, they likely even see it as valuable in bringing global condemnation upon Israel.
If the U.S. is serious about ending this war on terms that deny Hamas any path back to power, it must respond to Hamas by replacing rhetoric with leverage. What is needed now is not patience but a dramatic and public escalation of pressure — a demonstration that Washington is prepared to wield the world’s biggest baseball bat until Hamas yields.
The U.S. should start by declaring, publicly and unequivocally, that no reconstruction money or aid will enter Gaza while any part of it remains under Hamas control. That is the red line, and it must be enforced, not implied. It’s essential to take every step possible to show Hamas that the material and political costs of them keeping their guns substantially outweigh any benefits.
Next, the U.S. must move beyond gentle urging and demand action by the three Arab states that matter most: Qatar, Turkey and Egypt. Each has in some way helped to sustain Hamas, and each depends heavily on American goodwill. Washington should insist on deliverables — that the countries freeze accounts affiliated with Hamas, expel Hamas operatives and make public commitments to choke off support — and couple them with clear consequences for failure. If these governments want continued partnership, they must help end Hamas’s reign.
Vance’s Tuesday appearance set an underwhelming precedent for any of these actions.
The time is running short for the U.S. to establish a blunt public posture. That stance is the only one with a shot at conveying to Hamas that, if they don’t comply, war will, unfortunately and inevitably, resume.
I say this as someone who opposed the war’s continuation. But the truth is that the enormous moral and political costs already paid cannot justify an outcome in which Gaza is still ruled by armed fanatics. The sunk cost of this campaign demands a decisive outcome: a territory free of Hamas’s guns.
The American envoys, to their credit, repeated that objective. Yet they sounded like negotiators, not enforcers.
That same error has proved costly for this administration before. After the June war in which Israel — and then the U.S. — crippled Iran’s nuclear and missile program, Tehran was momentarily staggered and diplomatically isolated. That was the moment to extract concessions: a formal rollback of uranium enrichment, an end to proxy militia funding and real limits on missile development.
Instead, Trump bombastically claimed victory and moved on. Within weeks, Iran had resumed its patterns of defiance, with its leaders rejecting negotiations over the nuclear program with the U.S. and backing out of a recent cooperation deal with the United Nations nuclear watchdog IAEA.
His team can’t make the same mistake twice. It’s time for them to employ substantial U.S. leverage against the Arab states that can help keep things on course. Qatar hosts the region’s largest U.S. air base and holds hundreds of billions in American investments. Turkey is a NATO ally angling for defense deals and financial relief. Egypt’s military depends on U.S. aid. None can afford sustained friction with Washington. The time for polite persuasion has passed.
This is a binary moment. Either Hamas disarms and Gaza rebuilds under international supervision, or it clings to its weapons and condemns the territory to perpetual siege. There is no middle ground. Each week of drift lets the group rearm, recruit, and rewrite the narrative, emerging from the rubble and calling survival victory.
The habit of claiming credit before closing the deal — the instinct to declare progress rather than enforce it — haunts this administration. It is now offering a lifeline to Hamas. It must take pains to ensure that history does not record that the U.S. — amid risibly premature pomp and circumstance — turned what could have been a positive ending into yet another prelude for war.
