Spinoza vs. Maimonides, For the Future of Judaism

By Steven Nadler

Published December 02, 2009, issue of December 11, 2009.
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Maimonides, Spinoza and Us: Toward an Intellectually Vibrant Judaism
By Rabbi Marc D. Angel
Jewish Lights Publishing, 224 pages, $24.99.

A Fight to the Life: Although they agree on God, Spinoza (left) and Maimonides (right) differ on most points of moment.
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A Fight to the Life: Although they agree on God, Spinoza (left) and Maimonides (right) differ on most points of moment.

What does a 12th-century rabbi in Egypt, arguably the greatest thinker in Jewish history, have in common with a 17th-century Jewish philosopher in Amsterdam who was “expelled from the people of Israel” for “abominable heresies and monstrous deeds” and who would go on to become the most radical philosopher of his time? And what could their philosophical differences and similarities possibly have to do with us, many centuries later?

It depends. If the topic is the relationship between virtue and happiness, as well as how to eliminate irrational beliefs and superstitious behaviors from society, then Maimonides and Spinoza have a great deal in common. In fact, from this perspective, Spinoza carried Maimonides’s rationalist project to its ultimate logical conclusion.

But for Marc Angel, it is also about the future of Torah Judaism, its purification from superstitious elements and the strengthening of personal faith in the true God of the patriarchs and matriarchs. While Angel believes there may be much to learn from Spinoza and the challenge he poses to Judaism, his sympathies are wholly with Maimonides. Like Rambam, Angel is committed to a rational Judaism on an intellectual foundation and opposed to those who would hijack it into the realm of irrationality. The challenge for him, however, is to demonstrate how any religion grounded in divine revelation and committed to the idea of a providential God can avoid the charge of superstition.

Among the superstitions that both Maimonides and Spinoza combat is the anthropomorphization of God — the idea that God is a kind of person with a rich psychological and emotional life very much like ours, except infinitely greater. As Angel notes: “Rambam and Spinoza both located superstition in the realm of ignorance and irrational fear…. Rational people will learn to overcome the tendency toward superstition and will root their lives in reason and in an intellectual love of God.”

For Maimonides, however, the Torah is literally the word of God, communicated directly to Moses. It not only prescribes laws for worship and for religious, social and political organization, but also embodies metaphysical, theological and historical truths. For Spinoza, on the other hand, Hebrew Scripture is a work of human literature. While it may be a valuable source of moral guidance, it is not necessarily a source of truths about God, nature or human beings.

Moreover, Maimonides believed the ancient prophets to be morally and intellectually gifted individuals — much like philosophers, except with greater imaginative powers. Spinoza agreed with only this last point: The biblical prophets were distinguished by their particularly vivid imaginations. They certainly were not philosophers; indeed, they were not very learned at all.

Finally, Maimonides’s project in “The Guide of the Perplexed” is to reveal the foundations of the Law and to show that all its commandments are reasonable. Spinoza’s rationalism, on the other hand, leads him to conclude that Jewish ceremonial law is no longer valid; Moses instituted it for political purposes at a very specific historical moment. But with the destruction of the Temple, the ceremonial mitzvahs have lost their raison d’être.

For all these reasons, Spinoza has often been seen to prefigure a kind of secular, even Reform Judaism. But Angel wisely rejects this conclusion. He sees that what Spinoza is after is not a reform within Judaism, but a reform of religious sensibility altogether. What Spinoza calls “true religion” has to do not with sectarian observances, but simply with moral behavior toward others. As Angel puts it, Spinoza “shed his Jewishness without much remorse and may have seen himself as a prototype of what Jews (and all other human beings) should become: just plain human beings devoted to rational philosophy.” Maimonides, by contrast, sought an intellectually grounded Judaism devoid of superstition but not of its distinctiveness, a Judaism still wedded to the strict observance of Jewish law and ritual, and even certain doctrinal beliefs. Angel makes it clear that he sides with Maimonides against not only the hyper-rationalism of Spinoza, but also any attempts to ground Judaism in the irrational (his primary target is the Hasidim).

This is a thoughtful, engaging and accessible book, no mean feat when writing about such notoriously difficult thinkers. But the success of Angel’s project depends on how well he manages tensions that will be apparent to contemporary rationalist critics of religious belief. For example, while decrying attempts to import superstitious elements into Jewish practice (talismans, prayer for hire, etc.), he suggests that (according to Maimonides) the harm they bring includes the loss of one’s portion in the world to come. And Angel himself apparently believes in the efficacy of prayer, because “God is always present and listening everywhere.” These and other elements of even an “intellectually vibrant” Judaism will strike nonbelievers as no less superstitious than red strings and amulets.

In a way, the title of the book is misleading, suggesting, as it does, that Spinoza has something positive to contribute to a revitalization of Judaism. A more apt title would have been “Maimonides or Spinoza.” In fact, Spinoza has only a supporting role to play in Angel’s story. He sets the challenge for Judaism, to which someone like Maimonides must respond: How can there be a faith-based sectarian religion that is informed by rational thinking, one that avoids the Scylla of irrational faith and the Charybdis of rational unbelief? Spinoza denies that there can be any such thing; Maimonides wrote the “Guide” to show that there can. If Maimonides is the hero of this tale, Spinoza is its anti-hero.

Steven Nadler is chair of the department of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and author of “The Best of All Possible Worlds: A Story of Philosophers, God, and Evil” (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008).


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Comments
Sherlock Holmes Fri. Dec 4, 2009

I detect a slight problem. The Maimonides of the Guide for the Perplexed is not always consistent with Maimonides the author of Yad Chazakah or Mishneh Torah. On something as basic as the Temple service he implies in The Guide that it may have been an in between stage, while in Mishneh Torah he says clearly it will be restored. Maimonides the philosopher is not always the same as Maimonides the Posek or Halachic decision maker.

eli Sat. Dec 5, 2009

Statements and judgements like

“because 'God is always present and listening everywhere.” These and other elements of even an “intellectually vibrant” Judaism will strike nonbelievers as no less superstitious..."

and

"to ground Judaism in the irrational (his primary target is the Hasidim)"

only make sense if one limits human capacity to "rational" versus "irrational" /"superstitious."

One important aspect of religious life is to point to the fact that being human is much more than the small limits of rational versus irrational, and that rational is not the upper limit of human capacity. Life, and religious life, encourages one to go beyond these limits. And this is definitely present in the work of Spinoza, who is not at all limited to the "rational" despite the author's assertion of this. Certainly Spinoza's concepts of reality deals with issues of the human inadequate conception of reality, that the human grasp of the infinitely complex whole is limited. For even a short simplification of Spinoza's work, look at the Wikipedeia article at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spinoza.

Joe Feld Sun. Dec 6, 2009

Rabbi Angel appears to be using Moreh Nevuchim as the final word on Rambam, but many sages burnt the Moreh and condemned its attempt to reconcile Judaism with Aristotle. At one time Rambam was nearly as controversial as Spinoza !

Rabbi Tony Jutner Mon. Dec 7, 2009

Neither the Rambam nor Spinoza have anything new to offer. Only my philosophy of NewJudaism has the solution. Stop paying attention to these dusty figures of the past and start paying attention to me

Naomi Mon. Dec 7, 2009

While I am sure the book is thought-provoking, I don't see what is so new and different about these two figures all of a sudden that we don't already know.

Roger Schmeeckle Mon. Dec 7, 2009

Spinoza railed against "anthropomorphizing," but is not attributing thinking to God an example of anthropomorphizing?"

Michael Makovi Thu. Jan 7, 2010

What is so significant about Rabbi Angel's treatment of Spinoza is, I believe, how sympathetic Rabbi Angel is towards him. Rabbi Angel will bring Spinoza's rationalism, very respectfully, and then bring Rambam response. Rabbi Angel will always favor Rambam's view, but he treats Spinoza respectfully.

I'm not sure, but I think Rabbi Angel's view of Spinoza is similar to Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's and Rabbi A. I. Kook's view of Reform. For these two thinkers, Reform Judaism was an understandable (if lamentable, very very tragic!) response to the failures and perversities of Orthodoxy. Both thinkers note how Orthodoxy would avoid all study of Tanakh and Aggadah, and reduce themselves to legal casuistry. Rav Hirsch adds that Qabala became a superstitious magical mechanism. Given all this, both said, it is no wonder that Reform Judaism arose! Rav Hirsch described the Reform leaders as heretics, but he always described the laypeople as being well-intentioned, albeit misguided. His entire Nineteen Letters and Horeb are both intended largely for non-observant audiences.

I see Rabbi Angel's treatment of Spinoza similarly. He wholly disagrees with Spinoza, but he tries to be sympathetic, for he cannot blame Spinoza. If Spinoza's reasons for leaving Orthodoxy were anything like the reasons that Orthodox individuals today do the same, then Spinoza is an admirable figure who stood up for his conscience and the truth. Perhaps he misunderstood the truth, but he did his best. If, in opposing superstition, Spinoza became overly rational, the blame lies not with Spinoza, but rather, with his superstitious opponents who forced him to leave in the first place.

In a lecture Rabbi Angel gave once ("Rambam and the Philosophers: What Reason Can and Cannot Attain", http://www.merkaz.com/lectures.htm), Rabbi Angel said that Spinoza was inspired in part by a supposedly religious woman who tried to steal the money she owed Spinoza's father. Rabbi Angel also notes the kinds of miseducation that often occurs in religious schools (cf. his "Reflections on Torah Education and Mis-Education", http://www.jewishideas.org/min-hamuvhar/reflections-torah-education-and-mis-education). Rabbi Angel supposes that perhaps Spinoza received a miseducation that inspired his break with Orthodoxy. If so, says Rabbi Angel, the solution would have been for a good straight-thinking rabbi to teach Spinoza while he was still a child, to teach his proper Judaism.






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