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The Gaza war’s principal local political outcome was the further legitimization of Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip, a further expression of political Islam’s viability in the Palestinian sphere as well as elsewhere in the Arab world. The conflict also sent a critical message to the Israeli public and the Obama administration: Much as you might wish it, the Palestinian question will not go away. Other issues in the Middle East like the revolution in Syria and the stabilization of Egypt might seem more urgent. But the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still central.
Hence the last minute American and Israeli decision to acquiesce to the West Bank leadership’s bid for non-member observer state status at the United Nations. It is being seen as a chance to boost the prestige of the moderate PLO in its competition with Hamas. And the last minute reentry into the Israeli political arena of Tzipi Livni, who almost alone in this Israeli election champions the peace process.
Another important set of strategic lessons generated by this mini-war concerns the way other interested parties dealt with it. Look how tiny Qatar punched way beyond its weight in helping to mediate a ceasefire, thanks to its money and Al Jazeera. Of course, the real mediator was Egypt. Indeed, the subtext of the entire conflict for both Israel and Hamas was the behavior of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood leadership.
The ceasefire produced by the Egyptian army under President Mohamed Morsi has managed thus far to satisfy both parties as well as the U.S. (though a large portion of the Egyptian public is now furious over Morsi’s subsequent usurpation of dictatorial powers; but that’s a different story). Still, for Israel, Morsi’s real test lies ahead: preventing the smuggling of more lethal weapons into Gaza and thereby preventing another Hamas-Israel war in the near term.
President Barack Obama chose to deal with the Gaza fighting by once again rather effectively “leading from behind,” this time from East Asia, a part of the world on which his administration has placed a higher priority. He badgered Morsi into acting and Benjamin Netanyahu into not invading. What, if anything, he will do in the coming months about a two-state solution — or even, in view of Hamas’ permanency in Gaza, a three-state solution — remains the looming question.
Yossi Alpher is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. Until recently he coedited the bitterlemons.net family of internet publications.