It’s not every day that a prime minister who squandered his first term gets a second chance. Between 1974 and 1977, the inexperienced and anxious Yitzhak Rabin stumbled and failed, bringing to an end 29 years of Labor rule in Israel. Fifteen years later, he returned to power, vowing not to repeat his past blunders. His second term, until it was aborted by his assassination, was remarkable: It brought a breakthrough with the Palestinians, a revolution in the treatment of Israel’s Arab citizens and improvements to the nation’s education system and infrastructure.
Now it’s Benjamin Netanyahu’s turn to try to redeem his reputation. When the newspaper Yediot Aharonot asked 20 political experts to rank Israel’s prime ministers, Netanyahu, who governed from 1996 to 1999, finished second-to-last. Will he now follow in Rabin’s footsteps and enjoy a similarly successful comeback?
Netanyahu’s friends say he has learned from his mistakes. Surely, by forming a broad government — some say too broad — he was trying to avoid the narrow right-wing coalition of his first term, which had so polarized the Israeli public.
But how well Netanyahu can navigate Israel’s treacherous political currents won’t be the only variable determining the outcome of his second term. Factors that are more intrinsic to who he is as a leader will also play an important role.
The conventional wisdom about Netanyahu is that he can be pushed around, that he gives in easily to pressure, that he tends to panic. Some of his decisions in his first term seem to confirm that view. Soon after taking office in 1996, he authorized the opening of a controversial exit to the Western Wall archaeological tunnel, which led to an immediate eruption of violence and loss of life. Later, he gave the go-ahead to the insane (and unsuccessful) plot to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Meshal in Amman, jeopardizing critically important relations with Jordan.
To his credit, Netanyahu demonstrated an awareness of his weaknesses when he convinced Ehud Barak to join his government as defense minister. With the Iranian threat looming on the horizon, Netanyahu will benefit from Barak’s experience and cool-headedness. This pair goes back to the good old days of Sayeret Matkal, Israel’s legendary elite commando unit, when Barak was the commander and Netanyahu a crew leader (Netanyahu’s brother Yoni was the unit’s commander until he was killed in the raid on Entebbe). Netanyahu doesn’t have to address Barak as “sir” anymore, but surely he feels better with his onetime superior officer at his side.
Another key factor in shaping Netanyahu’s term will likely be ideology. Some see political motives behind Netanyahu’s hard-line rhetoric, but he is actually a true believer.
His views were shaped in part by the towering presence of his father, Benzion Netanyahu, a world-renowned expert on the Spanish Inquisition (a subject that lends itself to a dark view of Jewish history) and a harsh critic of any concession to the Arabs. “There is no Palestinian people, and you don’t create a state for a fictional people,” the prime minister’s 99-year-old father explained in a recent interview with the Israeli daily Ma’ariv.
Netanyahu’s own core beliefs are on display in his 1995 book “A Durable Peace: Israel and its Place Among the Nations.” He makes clear to readers that he views a Palestinian state as an existential threat to Israel, unless fundamental changes occur in Arab attitudes toward the Jewish state.
This, though, would require a lot of time, and the Obama administration doesn’t seem interested in waiting. Washington is already signaling its impatience with Netanyahu’s reluctance to embrace the concept of a two-state solution.
Does this mean a head-on collision between Washington and Jerusalem? Not necessarily. Netanyahu showed with the 1998 Wye River agreement that when push comes to shove, he will compromise to avoid a confrontation with the United States.
What’s more, Netanyahu, who prefers a grand strategy for a comprehensive peace with Israel’s neighbors to piecemeal territorial concessions, might surprise everyone by calling for a regional peace conference, and even latching onto the Arab peace plan. He seems to have fond memories of the 1991 Madrid peace conference, where he was a media star — and he might want a reprise, with himself in the central role of decision-maker.
Another avenue Netanyahu might pursue is negotiating with Syria. According to Yitzhak Mordechai, who served as defense minister during his first term, Netanyahu offered the Syrians — through his friend and envoy, Ronald Lauder — the entire Golan Heights in exchange for peace. It wouldn’t be surprising, therefore, if Netanyahu and Bashar al-Assad emerge one day shaking hands in Turkey.
If he pursues either of these two approaches, Netanyahu’s intention would likely be to put Arab-Israeli relations in a more regional context, thus marginalizing the Palestinian issue. Whether or not this would work is another question.
Israelis, in any case, seem willing to give Netanyahu a chance. Many give him high marks for his accomplishments as finance minister under Ariel Sharon, which enabled Israel to weather the current economic crisis better than other countries. But where Netanyahu has really excelled thus far in his political career is in spreading fear. Israelis today, though, are hungry for hope. Netanyahu’s second term will ultimately be judged on whether he can satisfy their yearning.
Uri Dromi served as spokesman for the governments of prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres.
Actually, in my view, one's view of Netanyahu is changed, even inverted, if he is seen through the prism of Sharon, his secret soul mate. Both held to the view that a Palestinian STATE never existed. But both realized that an Israeli one is as dubious an issue historically. Rather than an historical argument that argues for an Arab Sea-- which did exist-- surrounding a little Jewish island, both realize that separate Arab states are far more manageable. Sharon, especially having been a soldier, deemed peace so desperately necessary that he wanted to do extreme things to bring it about. Yet he always feared that if his face gives him away, the Arabs will never acquiesce to Israel's existence. The Greater Israel argument is-- IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS-- a bargaining chip. Israel is not a nation yet, it is an armored fetus on a US$ placenta and he does not want that to continue...indeed, he knows it can't. Behind the "Iron Wall" it has created a haven for some of the world's most brilliant people; both Sharon and Netanyahu realized that if Israel does not "plug into" the region it will die on the vine as a fruit that, like most desert fruits, desiccated to death. From the Founding Fathers on, therefore, Israeli diplomacy was the seeking of regional recognition at any price-- either through pleading or beating or a senseless oscillation through both. Alas, in its early years Israel found itself not only viewed as a stand in for Franco-British colonialism (an image some Israeli leaders foolishly promoted in order to make the Jewish state seem irreversible) but was also viewed as seeking total domination of the Middle East on behalf of the USA. Its obsessive abandonment of support for its benefactor, however, was completely missed by the Arabs. Bluffs such as feigning a desire to be a knuckle of NATO in the Mideast instead of a member of the Semitic World, was yet another deterrent tactic that backfired. Israel became a racist East European nation that suppressed not only Arabs but Mizrahi Jews because its leaders were trapped in an East Euro mindset. These old East Euro habits, unfortunately, blinded others to the pillar of the Jewish Ethic that lay under all the maneuvers. Now Israel is personally exasperating to most Israelis. Many express this by shooting each other, as reported by Ha'aretz, as often as they violently assault the Arabs. This, comfy Diaspora Jews cannot understand. For when they shave in the morning in London, Paris, New York etc, they know what their day will be like. But the Israeli looks in the mirror and has no idea if his day will be that of a soldier or a man seeking to build his future in his homeland. Because Israel punishes ambition as a vile violation of its welfare state, much as used to NYC's welfare system, while demanding endless armed service, it is understandable why use of arms is the most common expression of frustration. NO ONE IN ISRAEL APPRECIATES THIS BETTER THAN NETANYAHU. He knows for sure that "security" in Israel does not mean killing Arabs and taking their land, but rather, Israel leading the Arabs out of their medieval night. While the fecundity of Arabs is far greater than that of Israelis, this is not what panics Netanyahu. His fear is that young people are less than half of Israel's population and some 80% of the Arabs. A dynamic Israel can easily educate and create careers for all these Arabs together with its own while it creates careers for its own-- indeed it needs to. But the alternative is rather scary: that the Arab youth become millions of shahids seeking immortality in acts of terror because of the shame they feel, unable to do anything for their families stuck in static one crop (oil) Arab banana republics. Netanyahu is an economist more than a politician. The difference is that a politician spends his career wallowing in sh--t and therefore is so inured to it that he can't even smell it, while an economist has almost an allergic reaction to the slightest whiff of it. So if you are looking for a prism by which to look at Netanyahu, think of how will Israel break its addiction to US welfare, especially now at a time when America is broke. His solution is to find an integration of Arab wealth with Israeli know-how to modernize the region. Netanyahu has to give politics the BS it is due but economics requires technical ideas that make something into something-plus. Towards that end, he feels a need to end the Israeli bluffing that the neocons-- seeking "mesnch-hood" at Israel's expense-- perpetuated never understanding that it is symptomatic of the East Euro psychosis of the outsiders who created Israel. The Holocaust Industry seeks to entangle Jews into a doom and gloom inevitability, much like the Baptist End of Days. Sharon hoped to reach the Golden Days when he could end the brutality bluff and play the modernization cards with the Arabs. Netanyahu does not want to find his time run out...either by the end of term or by a stroke as in Sharon's case. So he is calling on the real Israelis-- THE SABRAS-- to move from Biblical eye for an eye to modern capitalism. THIS OBAMA REALIZES AND THIS IS WHY OBAMA WILL NOT ONLY CUT NETANYAHU LOTS OF SLACK, BUT SO WILL THE ARABS AND SO WILL THE PALESTINIANS. Alas, HAMAS will seem to run counter to the flow because it is, after all, the Muslim Brotherhood trying to be relevant over the whole of the Middle East. Similarly, the Haredi will be trying to impose their Kosher Sharia as well. But, under all the dead sea of BS-- the side of the coin rendering to politics what is due politics-- is the other side of the coin, the beginning of the attempted economic wave synchrony between Arab and Jewish states to bloom the desert economically. As I write this, I realize that I am an old man who believed in this outcome back when I was a young man visiting Israel. I may indeed not live to see "THE" day, nor may Netanyahu, like Sharon. But I am absolutely sure that Netanyahu is determined that the tough guy bluff is over and it is time for him to go to the Arabs and ask: OK cousin, what are we going to do; do we save the Middle East and bloom flowers in the desert or do we become carcasses in the sand? Israelis are tired, they are desperate and they are enraged. But as Netanyahu brings them to the light of "we" instead of "us vs. them"-- MAYBE-- he may become an historic figure as great as Ben Gourion....except that in his case, he will be hailed by the Arab cousins as much as by the Jews. Don't focus on his political BS nor on his BS cabinet. He, like Obama, is a transformative figure who doesn't seem like much but he has ideas that most Jews, drummed down by their East European psychosis transfixed on the Holocaust would not dare imagine. If we forget the "land for peace," the "land for blood," and the "iron wall," and think in terms of the new economic tomorrow for the entire region, we might get a sense of the real Netanyahu that rises to the task. I pray for his success as, I know for sure, many Jews and Arabs do in their secret communications with God.
My $0.02 is that Bibi enjoyed his first term in power, resented losing it, and after a decade wandering in the wilderness knows this is his last shot at the nepotistic fleshpots and ego-gratification thing.
To that end, he won't let a nasty cartoon of a foreign minister mess things up or be more than a bag-carrier and deniable player to the domestic gallery of Likudniks and Kahanites.
Lieberman himself will probably have the corners smoothed off by needing to talk to serious people in furrin parts, who know about most things Middle Eastern than the Russian doorman. We can but hope- G-d help Israel's image, already deep down in the can, if Avigdor carries on as he did when building a career as a coalitionist with a claim to a Cabinet seat. Luckily, history shows that loudmouths and idiots can learn by experience.
With Obama and Hillary offering a *little* more resistance to the Lobby, with Iran and Iraq getting friendlier by the day, with Pakistan Talibanising itself by the minute and with Afghanistan becoming as big a flypaper for the USA as it was for the USSR in the 1980s, this would be a particularly stupid time for braggart ultra-Zionists to chuck their weight around.
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